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The Statutory Framework of Grievance Arbitration 
in New Brunswick
Grievance arbitration is a means o f resolving disputes over the 
in terpretation  o f collective agreem ents developed as an alternative to 
settling those disputes at common law o r on the sidewalk. T h e  grievance 
arbitration process is a dynamic one, reflecting the fact that the 
continuing relationship between the parties is unlike a merely 
contractual tie. It is this difference that has prom pted one observer to 
describe the arbitration process as:
an integral part o f  the system o f self-governm ent. . . .  [T]he system is 
designed to aid management in its quest for efficiency, to assist union 
leadership in its participation in the enterprise, and to secure justice for the 
employees.
Such a characterization has been m ore o r less accepted by the Suprem e 
C ourt o f the U nited States.2
In New Brunswick, as in all o ther C anadian jurisdictions, the parties 
to a collective agreem ent are bound by legislation to that agreem ent for 
a fixed period o f tim e.3 D uring the term  o f the collective agreem ent 
they are prohibited from  resort to strike, picket o r lockout to force the 
resolution o f  interpretive disputes.4 Just as the certification process was 
developed as an alternative to economic coercion to obtain recognition, 
so the arbitration process or some alternative m ethod o f settling disputes 
involving the in terpretation o f the collective agreem ent is the legislatively 
prescribed trade-off for both industrial action and judicial in terference.5
In the U nited States, on the o ther hand , grievance arbitration is not 
prescribed by legislation. Indeed, efforts to impose schemes o f 
arbitration by statute have several times been declared unconstitutional.8 
T h e  parties to a collective agreem ent in the U.S. can, therefore, resort to 
the strike o r lockout; but in the overwhelm ing majority o f cases the 
parties voluntarily subm it themselves to binding arbitration when a 
dispute arises.
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'H arry  Shulman, "Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations", (1955) 68 Harvard L.R. 999 at 1024. 
transportation Communication Employers Union v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (1966), 385 U.S. 157.
’R.S.N.B 1973, c. 1-4, s. 56.
*lbid., s. 91. This is also true of all other Canadian jurisdictions except Saskatchewan.
'Ibtd , s. 55.
*See S. P. Simpson, "Constitutional Limitations on Compulsory Industrial Arbitration", (1925) 38 
Harvard L.R. 753.
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In C anada we have two d ifferen t systems o f grievance arbitration 
which, in practice, are very sim ilar.7 T he  first o f these is statutory: the 
parties are compelled by legislation to subm it their disputes to 
arbitration. T h e  o ther is a private, consensual system; it exists w here the 
statute compels the parties to submit to some m eans o f settling a dispute, 
but not necessarily arbitration.
New Brunswick has both systems. T h e  Industrial Relations Act, s. 55
(1) provides that:
Every collective agreement shall provide for the final binding settlement by 
arbitration or otherwise, without stoppage o f  work, o f  all differences between 
the parties to, or persons bound by, the agreement or on whose behalf it was 
entered into, concerning its interpretation, application, administration or an 
alleged violation o f  the agreement, including any question as to whether a 
matter is arbitrable.8
Because the section says “by arbitration o r otherw ise”, the New 
Brunswick C ourt o f Appeal held that the arbitration tribunal is not a 
statutory one; i.e., it is not one to which the parties are com pelled by 
law to resort.9 It is a private and consensual tribunal.
On the o ther hand, the New Brunswick Public Service Labour 
Relations Act does establish arbitration as a statutorily prescribed means 
o f settling disputes.10 In fact, the grievance arbitration system established 
un d er that act is called “adjudication”, which seems to reinforce the 
image o f a m ore formal system. T h e  Public Service Labour Relations Act 
does not perm it parties to select an alternative system. In the Sewell case, 
the C ourt o f Appeal recognized this distinction and held an adjudicator 
un d er that Act was a statutory body o r tribunal.”
I have already noted that there is a difference between these two 
systems. T h a t difference is the courts’ inherent right to review the 
decisions o f statutory arbitrators for jurisdictional erro r. T hey do not, on 
the o ther hand, have a right to review the decisions o f private 
consensual arb itra to rs.12
7One could say that we have a third system in that in Saskatchewan the American situation described 
above prevails.
"S. 81 declares that the Arbitration Act R.S.N.B. 1973, c. A-10 does not apply to an arbitration under s.
55.
*Re Atlantic Sugar Refineries Ltd. and Bakery and Confectionery Workers International Linton o f American Local 
No. 433  (1961), 27 D.L.R. (2d) 310 (N.B.C.A.).
l0Pubhc Service Labour Relations Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. P-25, s. 91.
"R e  Sewell (1972), 4 N.B.R. (2d) 514 (N.B.C.A.), at 520.
“ See generally on this distinction: Re International Nickel Co. o f Canada and Rivanda (1956), 2 D.L.R. (2d) 
700 (Ont. C.A.); Re International Nickel Co. o f Canada and International Union o f Mine, M ill &  Smelter 
Workers, Local 637  (1959), 19 D.L.R. (2d) 380 (Ont. C.A.); United Steel Corporation Ltd. v. Fuller (1958),
12 D.L. R (2d) 322 (Ont. C.A.); Re Texaco Canada Ltd. and Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International 
Union, Lcxal 16-599 (1964), 44 D.L.R. (2d) 199 (Ont. H.C.); Howe Sound Co. v. Internationa! Union 
Mine, M ill and Smelter Workers (1962), 33 D.L.R. (2d) 1 (S.C.C.); Port Arthur Shipbuilding Co. v. Arthurs 
(1968), 70 D.L.R. (2d) 693 (S.C.C.); Bell Canada v. Office and Professional Employees' International 
Union (1973), 37 D.L.R. (3d) 561 (S.C.C.).
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In practice, however, this distinction in the reviewability o f decisions 
is largely academic. A lthough there  is no inheren t right in the courts to 
review the decisions o f  a consensual arb itrator, one can nonetheless 
proceed in court by way o f a motion to quash on the ground that the 
decision is outside the bounds o f what was consented to ;13 o r there  may 
be a statutory right o f review. U nder the Industrial Relations Act o f  New 
Brunswick, for exam ple, there is such a statutory right. Section 78(1) 
provides that:
Where, in any proceeding under the provisions o f  section 55,
(a) an arbitrator has misconducted himself or the proceedings, the Court 
may remove him,
(b) an arbitrator has misconducted himself or the proceedings, or an 
arbitration or award has been improperly procured, the Court may set the 
award aside,
(c) an arbitrator or an arbitration board has decided that a question is 
arbitrable and an award was made by an arbitrator or arbitration board 
determining that question, the Court may, if in its opinion the question was 
not arbitrable, set the award aside,
(d) an arbitrator or arbitration board has decided that a question is not 
arbitrable, the Court may, if in its opinion the question was arbitrable, order 
that the question be tried by the arbitrator or arbitration board.
In practice these are the same grounds upon which a court with an 
inheren t power to review may set aside an arb itra to r’s decision.
T his w riter does not share the often heard concern over the 
intrusion o f  judicial review into the arbitration process.14 A healthy 
system o f arbitration, com m anding the confidence o f the parties, is in no 
danger from  supervision by the judiciary. Frequent resort to the courts 
may however be an indication that the system is not in good health o r 
that it lacks the confidence o f the parties. This raises one o f  the less 
obvious distinctions between the private consensual arbitration un d er the 
Industrial Relations Act and the statutory system u n d er the Public Service 
Labour Relations Act.
Since arbitration is, at least theoretically, a system o f choice u nder 
the Industrial Relations Act, it exists because o f the parties’ com m itm ent to 
it. If the parties have a real com m itm ent to the process as an 
extra-judicial m eans o f settling their disputes, then resort to the courts 
to have those decisions set aside ought to be infrequent; and, indeed, it 
is relatively infrequent in New Brunswick. O n the o therhand , arbitration
>3Howe Sound Co. v. International Union o f Mine, M ill and Smelter Workers, (1962), 33 D.L.R. (2d) 1 (S.C.C.); 
International Association o f Machinists and Aerospace Workers and Hudsons Bay M ining &  Smelting Co. 
Ltd. (1967), 66 D.L.R.- (2d) 1 (S.C.C.); Association o f Radio and Televisions o f Canada v. CBC  (1973), 40
D.L.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.).
14See for example. P. C. Weiler, "The ‘Slippery Slope' of Judicial Interi'ention", (1971) 9 Osgoode Hall L.R. 1.
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in the Public Service is not a system o f choice but one to which the 
parties are com pelled to resort. O ne m ight therefore expect their 
com m itm ent to the system to be somewhat less; and, indeed, from  that 
system there is relatively frequent resort to the courts to review the 
decisions o f arbitrators. T his may be com pounded by the fact that, while 
the parties are free to nam e arbitrators in their public service collective 
agreem ents,15 they rarely do so; they are not then a party to the 
selection o f  their arb itrator. U nder the Industrial Relations Act, on the 
o ther hand, the parties select their arbitrator, and it is only when they 
cannot agree that this becomes the responsibility o f  the M inister o f 
Labour and M anpow er.16 Even then he m ust have regard for those 
people who are unacceptable to either o f the parties.
T hus far it has been established that private sector grievance 
arbitration is private because it is resorted to, in theory at least, by 
choice. In fact, parties to a collective agreem ent have never selected a 
m eans o ther than arbitration to settle their differences. If  the parties fail 
to include a clause for the final resolution o f disputes, the agreem ent 
will be deem ed to include a ra th er com prehensive arbitration clause that 
appears in s. 55 (2) o f the act. If  the parties agree on an arbitration 
clause that is, in the opinion o f the Industrial Relations Board, 
inadequate, the Board may, on application o f  one o f the parties, modify 
the clause so as not to conflict with the legislation.17 Essential features, 
such as the m anner o f  appointing an arb itra tor w here the parties fail to 
agree on the selection and agreem ent that the arb itra tor has jurisdiction 
to determ ine the arbitrability o f the m atter in dispute, m ust appear in 
the arbitration clause. Sections 73 and 78 o f the Industrial Relations Act 
establish the powers o f  an A rbitration Board o r single arb itra tor and set 
out certain procedural requirem ents, such as the taking o f an oath, the 
settling o f time limits for m aking an award, and the m anner o f 
enforcem ent o f an award.
O ne o f the m ore im portant o f  these sections establishing the 
arb itra to r’s powers is s. 76 (1), which allows him to substitute penalties 
for the discharge o r discipline m eted out by an em ployer in cases where 
cause exists and the contract does not itself contain specific penalties for 
the infraction. This section is a result o f  legislative reaction to the 
Suprem e C ourt o f C anada’s decision in the Port Arthur Shipbuilding  
case,18 in which it was held that an arbitrator, having found that “cause” 
for penalty did exist, exceeded his jurisdiction in varying that penalty. 
Thus the provision in the Industrial Relations Act em pow ering the 
arb itra to r to vary a penalty gives him considerably m ore rem edial scope
Port Arthur Shipbuilding Co. v. Arthurs (1968), 70 D.L.R. (2d) 693 (S.C.C.).
"Public Service Labour Relations Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. P-25, s. 95(2)(a).
"S . 55(2).
11Industrial Relations Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. 1-4, s. 55(5).
CASE COMMENTS  •  NOTES •  CHRONIQUE DE JURISPRUDENCE 261
than he would otherw ise have, although it has also been criticized as 
subjecting him to the tem ptation to compromise.
T h a t is briefly the statutory fram ework o f grievance arbitration in 
New Brunswick. It is often incorporated to some extent in the collective 
agreem ent itself. T h e  only purpose o f this arbitration m achinery is to 
assist in the adm inistration o f the substantive provisions in the collective 
agreem ent. T ogether these procedural and substantive provisions are 
the system o f private law by which the parties agree to be bound for the 
duration  o f the contract.
Private consensual arbitration is in theory a m eans by which parties 
to a collective agreem ent can have their disputes settled expeditiously, 
inexpensively and by persons who have some expertise in the area o f 
disputes. U nfortunately, grievance arbitration today is not expeditious; it 
is also not inexpensive. I would go on to say that it is also in some 
danger from  having m atters decided by persons who lack expertise in 
the area o f dispute. It is generally accepted that this is because we have 
allowed the lawyers to become involved in the arbitration process.
T his is part o f  the problem , but it is only a symptom o f a m ore 
fundam ental reason: that the parties often do not perceive grievance 
arbitration as the private consensual system it is supposed to be. They do 
not accept the process as providing the final and binding solution o f 
their disputes. T hey  do not recognize the system as a creature o f their 
own m aking and one which they are free to change when it ceases to 
serve their purposes. Lawyers may have taken over the arbitration 
process but they were invited to do so. In this regard  the rem arks o f  Dr. 
H. D. Woods to the 1979 annual m eeting o f the National Academy of 
A rbitrators are apposite.
I sometimes think I am one o f a vanishing breed, an arbitrator who is not 
trained in the law. And in somber moments I am inclined to reflect on the 
gradual change which seems to be inevitably altering the makeup o f  this 
demi-profession. T he volumes o f  the proceedings o f  the Academy and o f  
other publications devoted to arbitration and industrial relations bear massive 
witness to the fact that what emerged a few short decades ago as an 
instrument o f  the parties in industrial relations to assist themselves in 
resolving disputes over conflicting rights and obligations is itself becoming 
more formalized and more detached from its creators, management and 
labour. In my deepest moments o f  gloom, or should I say envy, I have 
difficulty repressing the despairing cry: ‘Arbitration is dead; long live the 
legal profession’.19
T h e  consequences o f  arbitration ceasing to serve the interests o f 
labour and m anagem ent are enorm ous. It m eans that unions o r their 
m em bers will resort to the unsanctioned strike o r will store up 
grievances like snowballs with which to pum m el their opposite party in
'•H . D. Woods, "Shadows Over Arbitration”, President’s Address to the 30th Annual Meeting o f the 
National Academy of Arbitrators (Spring. 1979).
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the next set o f contract negotiations. In too m any instances a grievance 
arising from a small unit o f employees will not be satisfactorily resolved 
but will not go to arbitration because o f the cost involved o r the 
uncertainty o f  the outcom e. T h a t issue will come u p  at the next 
bargaining session and its resolution will be term ed a ‘pre-condition’ to 
bargaining by the union o r m anagem ent.
In the address from  which I have already quoted Dr. Woods 
expresses the belief that the d ifference between a voluntary system of 
arbitration and a statutory process is significant, and one that has 
influenced the tone and character o f  arbitration. I f  one looks at the 
cu rren t writing on arbitration in Canada, generated by the A rthurs- 
YVeiler Shool, which also encompasses George Adams, Donald Brown, 
David Beatty and perhaps Innis Christie, one notes that they speak o f a 
com m on law o f arbitration and the “policy m aking m odel” o f 
arb itra tion .20 T hey are concerned with the developm ent o f this system 
over time just as the judicial system developed. T hey have spear-headed 
the publication o f arbitration decisions and encouraged the writing o f 
reasons for decision. T h e  logical culm ination o f this is, as Dr. Woods 
points out, the developm ent o f state agencies to resolve grievance 
disputes that are a close parallel to the Courts. T h a t is already the case 
in British Columbia w here at one time arbitration was, at least in theory, 
a private process.
In New Brunswick we are at a crossroads. T h e  present system of 
arbitration in the private sector, especially in the construction industry, is 
not being used properly. T h ere  are com plaints from  labour and from 
m anagem ent that arbitration awards too often do not solve their 
problem s and indeed frequently exacerbate them . T h ere  are also 
com plaints that the process is expensive and that it takes too long. We 
can take two roads from  here. We can develop a m ore adequate 
statutory system o f arbitration, o r we can encourage labour and 
m anagem ent in o u r Provinces independently  to develop a m ore suitable 
private system.
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